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BOLSTERING THE PROTECTION OF
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL




The Malawian Constitution protects a handful of socio-economic rights in the Bill
of Rights and enshrines the rest as part of directive principles of national policy. The
only socio-economic rights expressly protected in the Bill of Rights are the right to
education; the right to participate in cultural life of one's choice; the right to engage
freely in economic activity, to work and pursue a livelihood; and the right to
development. Socio-economic rights are thus not given the same level of protection
as civil and political rights. Yet the Malawi Law Commission (Commission) in its
current review of the Constitution has not identified these rights as a point of focus.
The attitude of the Commission reflects the ideological position that regards
socio-economic rights as incapable of judicial enforcement and as being inferior to
civil and political rights. This article outlines the theoretical basis for including
socio-economic rights as justiciable protections within the Malawian Constitution.
I INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the Malawi Law Commission (Commission) embarked on the
review of the 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. The decision to
review the Constitution was motivated by the fact that, on many occasions, the
credibility of the Constitution has been questioned and many conflicts have
arisen regarding its interpretation.1 According to the Commission, one of the
areas which have stirred debate includes the provisions in the Bill of Rights.
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However, without elaborating on the nature of this debate, the
Commission has identified several issues in the area of human rights, which
it regards as being pertinent to the review process. These include the death
penalty, marriage rights, children’s rights, the right to education, the rights of
arrested and detained persons, and political rights relating to political party
funding.2 Thus, apart from the right to education, economic, social and
cultural rights (socio-economic rights) have not been included as a point of
focus in the constitutional review. The attitude towards these rights follows
the model implicit in the current Constitution whereby only a handful are
protected in a justiciable Bill of Rights whilst the rest are enshrined as part of
the directive principles of state policy.3
The only socio-economic rights expressly protected in the Bill of Rights
are the right to education;4 the right to participate in cultural life of one’s
choice;5 the right to freely engage in economic activity, to work and pursue a
livelihood;6 and the right to development.7 Socio-economic rights are thus
not given the same attention as civil and political rights. Yet it appears that
this unequal protection does not bother the Commission. The attitude of the
Commission reflects the ideological position that regards socio-economic
rights as incapable of being enforced judicially and as inferior to civil and
political rights.
Malawi is not alone in treating these rights in this manner; the same
treatment is reflected in a number of constitutions of African countries,
which give some protection to these rights in the Bill of Rights and recognise
others as directive principles of state policy.8
This article outlines the theoretical basis for the inclusion of
socio-economic rights as justiciable protections within the Malawian
Constitution. It starts with a discussion of the reasons that led to the
adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (the ICESCR)9 in 1966 as well as the jurisprudence that has developed
since that year. The article also attempts to identify the factors that might
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7 Section 30, which is broadly couched to mean enjoyment of economic, social, cultural and
political development.
8 These include Ghana, Namibia and Uganda.
9 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 at New York,
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explain the limited protection of socio-economic rights in the Malawian
Constitution. It concludes by recommending that Malawi should adopt the
full range of socio-economic rights in its Constitution as have several other
African countries.10
II RELEGATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
A International perspective
The protection of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights proved
controversial at the adoption of the ICESCR. A number of countries, mostly
from the ‘West,’ argued that these rights could not be enforced legally
because they were imprecise. These rights were also perceived of as
engendering positive obligations and not the negative obligations usually
associated with civil and political rights. In contrast, countries, mainly from
the ‘East,’ argued for the full legal recognition of socio-economic rights. They
considered these rights to be critical to people’s socio-economic development
and to the protection of the basic needs of the poor such as shelter, food,
clothing, access to medical care and work.11
As a compromise, the ICESCR was adopted separately from the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)12 contrary to an
earlier direction from the United Nations General Assembly (GA) that had
called for the adoption of a single covenant incorporating both categories of
rights.13
The perceived distinction between the two categories of rights is also
reflected in the manner in which their respective obligations are defined. The
rights in the ICESCR are to be realised progressively to the maximum of the
available resources.14 However, in respect of the civil and political rights, states
undertook to respect and ensure these rights without any express limitations
pertaining to the availability of resources.15 The distinction is also reflected in
the enforcement measures provided in the two Covenants. The ICCPR was
adopted together with an optional protocol establishing an individual
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complaints mechanism.16 No such mechanism was put in place in respect of
the ICESCR. This disparity worked to entrench the perception that the rights in
the ICESCR were incapable of judicial enforcement. As the drafters of the
ICESCR thought that these rights required extensive state action, they
envisaged that these rights would be best realised through international
cooperation and the work of intergovernmental organisations.17
The objection to the full recognition of socio-economic rights has taken
two dimensions; the legitimacy dimension and the institutional competence
dimension.18 The legitimacy objection is rooted in the traditional conception
of human rights. The question here is whether it is legitimate to give courts
the power to enforce socio-economic rights in light of their nature.19 The
traditional conception of human rights views social justice as involving the
redistribution of wealth and the intervention of the state in the free market
economy. Adherents to this view hold that the constitution and courts should
not be involved in the redistribution of wealth as this would adversely affect
the functioning of the free market. The market economy functions best
without state intervention and endorses those rights that protect individuals
against the state (civil and political rights). Socio-economic rights are
believed to engender affirmative features that are dangerous to the market
economy.20
In terms of the institutional competence dimension the judiciary is
considered to be ill-equipped to deal with the complex matters of social
justice. This argument draws on the concerns of majoritarian democracy.
Issues of social justice are viewed as matters falling within the province of
elected representatives, not the unelected judges.21
This article is not concerned with the institutional competence problem
but focuses on the legitimacy objection simply because an adequate response
to the later renders the former irrelevant. It will critique the objections
against socio-economic rights which, as will be shown below, overstate the
differences in the nature of these two sets of rights.22 In the main, it argues
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that civil and political rights and socio-economic rights are largely similar,
without ignoring the fact that they exhibit some important differences.
However, these differences do not warrant downgrading socio-economic
rights.
B Domestic perspective
The failure to include socio-economic rights in a comprehensive manner
in the 1994 Malawi Constitution has been attributed to the nature of the
process through which the Constitution was adopted. This process ‘was not
preceded by a careful analysis of the various models of protecting these rights
principally because the Constitution was adopted hurriedly.’23 The drafters of
the Constitution ignored the fact that Malawi had ratified international and
regional instruments protecting socio-economic rights such as the ICESCR
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter).24
Another very important, yet least discussed factor, to explain the scant
attention given to socio-economic rights in African countries relates to the
objectives that propelled human rights discourse on the African continent.
The early 1990s witnessed the introduction of multi-party democracy and
regular elections in many African countries. This change was in a large
measure driven by the donor community which at the time held the view that
participatory democracy and the empowerment of civic society were
necessary for Africa to overcome underdevelopment. Thus, constitutions that
emerged as a result laid emphasis on civil and political rights. Malawi seems
to fit in this general trend.
By failing to protect socio-economic rights in a comprehensive manner,
the Malawian Bill of Rights not only contradicts the preambular guarantee of
welfare and development for all but also a fails to respond to the high levels of
poverty in the Country.25 Malawi is one of the least developed countries in the
world and is characterised by socio-economic marginalisation pegged to such
factors as gender, geographical location and social class.26 Recent research
indicates that 52.4% of the Malawian population (approximately 4.4 million
people) lives below the poverty line; 22.4% of these (approximately 2.7
million people) are in dire poverty.27 In these circumstances, socio-economic
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rights would be a formidable tool for alleviating poverty and marginalisation.
These rights impose obligations on the state to prioritise the meeting of
people’s basic needs and could be used by individuals to fulfil their full
potential.28 It is in this context that the importance of constitutionalising
socio-economic rights should be understood. In the next section, arguments
against protecting socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights are analysed
and countered.
III ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS
A Human rights engender negative obligations
Historically, human rights have been conceived of as safeguards aimed at
protecting the individual from the state.29 The aim of human rights is
therefore to guarantee freedom.30 This conception of human rights derives
from the natural rights theory.31 This theory holds that the state may not
interfere with the individual’s freedom and liberty; the individual must be
placed in a bracket beyond the reach of the state.32 Those who support this
philosophy restrict human rights to those norms that engender negative
obligations on the state.33
However, modern human rights have not been inspired by the natural
law theory alone. To be sure, the International Bill of Rights was inspired by a
need for solutions to moral and political problems34 caused by the two world
wars and the emergence of dictatorships.
One of the purposes of the UN is to solve problems of an economic, social,
cultural or humanitarian nature.35 Such problems include lack of access to
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basic needs such as food, shelter, health care services and employment.
It is also important to note that on closer scrutiny, civil and political rights
too engender positive obligations. It is on this basis that Sepúlveda submits
that all human rights impose a ‘continuum’ or ‘spectrum’ of obligations. 36 On
the one side of the spectrum is the obligation of non-interference by the state
and on the other side is the obligation requiring positive action. Both civil and
political rights and socio-economic rights should, therefore, be viewed
through this spectrum. Thus, the South African Constitutional Court in the
First Certification case held that at ‘the very minimum, socio-economic rights
can be negatively protected from improper invasion.’37
Likewise, the obligations of states under the ICCPR are not restricted to
the duty to respect civil and political rights; states also have the obligation to
take specific measures to realise these rights.38
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that certain socio-economic rights call
for more extensive state action than civil and political rights.39 This is what
makes judicial review of socio-economic rights more difficult than civil and
political rights. This concession should not be understood to mean that civil
and political rights litigation do not challenge inaction. The difference is one
of the degrees of positive action required.
B Universality of human rights
Cranston submits that socio-economic rights are not human rights
because they lack the essential characteristics of universality and absolutism.40
Human rights are said to be universal if they accrue to every individual by
virtue of their humanity rather than as a result of their position or role in
society.41 Socio-economic rights are said to accrue to classes of people and,
therefore, lack universality. Additionally, it has been argued that
socio-economic rights do not derive from one’s humanity. Cranston describes
socio-economic rights as ‘mere utopian aspirations.’
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Cranston’s objection is based on the idea of ‘substantive universality’ as
opposed to ‘conceptual universality.’ The theory of conceptual universality is
not intended to prove the existence or even justiciability of rights. It is merely
based on the belief that human rights apply to all human beings equally.42 In
contrast, substantive universality is intended to prove or disprove certain
rights based on certain characteristics of human rights.43
What I understand from Cranston’s objection is that human rights are
supposed to focus on the individual and cannot be couched as group rights.
Cranston is not saying that socio-economic rights are relative, but rather that
human rights do not exist to protect collective interests. In his opinion,
human rights are norms that protect the individual and not groups as
socio-economic rights do.
However, Cranston’s objection lacks merit. Both categories of rights have
elements that focus on the individual as well as on collective interests. A
number of civil and political rights are enjoyed meaningfully only in groups.
For instance, the freedoms of association and assembly become useful only
when exercised by a group. Members of the media profession may
collectively demand respect for their freedom of speech through their
professional bodies. Academics, scientist, politicians, minority groups and
artists, too, may make similar demands for freedoms of expression and
association.
On the other hand, even the so-called collective rights empower the
individual. Better health, freedom from hunger and the proceeds of
employment all benefit the individual in as much as they promote societal
cohesion.44
Therefore, all rights, in addition to protecting the individual, promote
collective interests.45 All human rights, whether civil and political or
socio-economic, are aimed at creating an environment in which individuals
flourish and decide how they want to live.
C Absolutism and resources
Absolutism refers to the notion that rights belong to all human beings
simply on account of their humanity without any pre-requisite conditions.
Socio-economic rights are said not to be absolute. Instead, their realisation is
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subject to state resources.46 Bossuyt goes as far as submitting that civil and
political rights can be realised immediately because their realisation does not
require resources; all the state has to do is to abstain from infringing them.47
Robertson asserts that positive rights require rationing and a compulsory
transfer of resources and that negative rights, on the other hand, require only
the provision of services equally to all at all times. On this basis, he criticises
redistributive expenditure as counter-productive because, rather than
enhance the standard of living, it reduces it.48
However, these arguments are misconceived. The implementation of civil
and political rights, as is the case with socio-economic rights, requires
resources.49 For the right to life to be protected, a police force and an army
must be trained, equipped, and regularly and adequately funded. For the
right to a fair trial to be exercised, courts have to be built and staffed; judges
and members of the legal profession have to be trained; and legal aid must be
provided to the indigent. All these are done at state expense.50
It is also not true that socio-economic rights always require resources to
be realised. These rights, like civil and political rights, impose an obligation
on the state to respect them to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of
rights.51
Furthermore, all government expenditure has a redistributive effect
irrespective of the nature of the right upon which it is spent. Expenditures on
civil and political rights too have redistributive implications. As Robertson
concedes, the state does not create wealth through taxation. This applies to
expenditure on socio-economic rights as well as civil and political rights.
It should also be noted that the objection to socio-economic rights on the
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basis of resources confuses two things: justiciability and implementation or
enforcement. While enforcement may require resources, recognition of the
justiciability of socio-economic rights does not. It is also true, as indicated
above, that socio-economic rights do not always require resources for them to
be realised or respected. As can be deduced from article 2 of the ICESCR,52
states are only expected to realise socio-economic rights progressively to the
maximum of their available resources.
D Vagueness
The other objection to the enforcement of socio-economic rights points to
their vagueness. These rights are considered by some to be too
‘indeterminate’53 or vague for a judge to determine their precise scope.54 Neier
has argued recently that socio-economic rights are broad assertions not
suitable for judicial enforcement.55
An immediate response to this objection is that civil and political rights
are also vague.56 For example, the question as to what amounts to inhuman
or degrading treatment cannot be answered with precision. The same can be
said of free speech. The vagueness of civil and political rights has partly been
cleared up through many years of adjudication. By contrast, socio-economic
rights have not had a similar advantage.57 This is one of the reasons why the
adoption of a complaints procedure to the ICESCR has been proposed.58 To
deny the justiciability of socio-economic rights is to limit the opportunities
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for elaborating their obligations.59
E Human rights obligations
As pointed out earlier, all rights entail the duty to respect, the duty to
protect, the duty to promote, and the duty to fulfil. General Comments
produced by the CESCR have helped to clarify the meaning of these
obligations with respect to socio-economic rights. The obligation to respect
requires states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of
socio-economic rights.60 The state must respect the free use of resources by
individuals or groups for the purpose of satisfying human needs.61
The duty to protect requires the state to prevent third parties from
violating the rights of individuals or groups.62 It requires the state to take
measures, such as legislation and regulations, to prohibit third parties from
interfering with the enjoyment of socio-economic rights. In addition, the
state should put in place an effective framework for seeking redress for
violations of rights committed by third parties.
The duty to promote is the least discussed of the duties; the CESCR itself
did not include the duty to promote in its initial General Comments.63
Recently, however, the Committee has defined this duty as a component of
the duty to fulfil. In its General Comment on the right to water, the
Committee has said that the ‘obligation to fulfil can be disaggregated into the
obligations to facilitate, promote and provide.’64 It then defined these duties
thus:
The obligation to facilitate requires the State to take positive measures to assist
individuals and communities to enjoy the right. The obligation to promote obliges
the State party to take steps to ensure that there is appropriate education
concerning the hygienic use of water, protection of water sources and methods to
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minimize water wastage. States parties are also obliged to fulfil (provide) the right
when individuals or a group are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize
that right themselves by the means at their disposal.65
IV CONCLUSION
This paper has provided a theoretical basis for the inclusion of the full
range of socio-economic rights in the Malawian Constitution as fully
justiciable rights. Malawi has already committed itself to these rights by
ratifying a number of international instruments. These include the ICESCR
and the African Charter. Malawi has also already included the right to
education, the right to family protection, the right to economic activity,
labour rights and the right to development in its Bill of Rights. The rights
which are currently not protected include the right to the highest attainable
standard of health, the right to water, the right to education, the right to food,
the right to social security, and the right to housing. For the Malawian Bill of
Rights to fully enshrine the principle of the indivisibility of all rights, it ought
to protect these rights.
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